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Abstract
Modern recommendation systems rely on the wisdom of the crowd to learn the
optimal course of action. This induces an inherent mis-alignment of incentives between
the system’s objective to learn (explore) and the individual users’ objective to take the
contemporaneous optimal action (exploit). The design of such systems must account
for this and also for additional information available to the users. A prominent, yet
simple, example is when agents arrive sequentially and each agent observes the action
and reward of his predecessor. We provide an incentive compatible and asymptotically
optimal mechanism for that setting. The complexity of the mechanism suggests that
the design of such systems for general settings is a challenging task.
1 Introduction
Modern on-line recommendation systems (hereinafter called ‘mediators’) have a two way
relationship with their users (hereinafter called ‘agents’). Obviously they share information
with agents by means of recommendations. However, they also turn to agents to collect
information, which later on is processed into the aforementioned recommendations. It is
convenient to think of this in the context of an abstract model that is inspired by the
classical multi-armed bandit model. Self motivated agents arrive sequentially. At each stage
the new agent is recommended which arm to pull. The agent is not confined to choose the
recommended arm and may decide to choose another arm, based on some other information
he may have. Whichever arm he pulls as well as the associated reward is observed by the
mediator. This new information will later on be compiled into recommendations made to
the following agents.
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The goal of the mediator is to learn which arm performs better and only then to steer
newly arriving agents to the optimal arm. However, agents are short lived and would like
to exploit the information. Some concrete applications of this abstract model that are com-
mercially popular are hotel choice (e.g., Agoda.com), travel routes (e.g., Waze and Google
maps), service providers (e.g., Uber), out-sourcing freelancers (upwork.com), lending oppor-
tunities (e.g., Lendingclub.com) and so on and so forth. Note that in each of these settings
there is a tension between the individual user who wants to take the optimal action and the
objective of the mediator that wants to constantly learn the quality of new options (how
good is the new hotel? How fast is a previously congested route? How proficient is the new
UX developer?).
Using a distributed variant of multi-armed bandit to study the tension between the long
term objective of the mediator and the myopic agents was first introduced in [6]. Their
primary contribution is to design a mediator, a mapping from the information accumulated
into recommendations at each stage, where it is in the best interest of agents to adopt the
recommendations (‘incentive compatibility’), yet in the long term the optimal arm will be
identified. This exciting news has been extended in [8] and [9] to several more elaborate
bandit settings and to additional optimization criteria such as regret minimization.
The aforementioned papers make the implicit assumption that agents cannot see nor
communicate with each other. This assumption may be unrealistic in some settings. When
choosing a hotel via a mediator agents account for the recommendation but also account
for what acquaintances recommend. In a restaurant example, agents will account for the
choice chosen by their predecessors and tend to go to more crowded places. Unfortunately,
the results obtained in [6], [8] and [9] are not robust to changes in the implicit assumption
of no visibility. In fact, even with very little observability, for example when each agent just
sees the action chosen by his immediate predecessor, the schemes proposed in those papers
cease to be incentive compatible and lead to market failure.
The challenge of approximately optimal incentive compatible schemes subject to partial
observability among the agents was addressed in [1]. In that paper it is assumed that agents
can view actions chosen by some of their predecessors but cannot observe the reward. They
characterize structural properties that allow for the design of optimal schemes and provide
explicit constructions. In the current paper we enhance the observability assumption - not
only do agents see the actions of predecessors but they can also see the reward. It turns out
that whenever agents observe each other actions and rewards it is quite challenging for the
mediator to get new agents to explore unknown or previously bad possibilities. Due to this
challenge we focus on what is arguably a very elementary model, both in terms of reward
distribution as well as of observability:
• We study a model with two arms only. The rewards distribution from one arm, which
we refer to as the ‘safe’ arm, are well known to all agents (as agents are risk neutral we
can reduce the distribution to its expectation). The other arm, the ‘risky’ arm, follows
one of the two possible distributions, both with the same binary support.
• Each agent only observes the action and reward of his immediate predecessor.
2
Our main contribution is the design of a mediator that is incentive compatible as well as
approximately asymptotically optimal. That is, rational agents follow the meiator’s rec-
ommendations while the optimal arm is eventually uncovered with high probability and
thereafter all agents are recommended that arm. We follow occum’s razor and present a
model with elementary settings and show that even in those settings, the mediator turns out
to be quite complex. The resulting mediator is very different from those proposed in [6], [8],
[9] and [1].
An easy way to overcome the tension between the objectives of the mediator and those
of the agents is by introducing payoffs. In this case the mediator can pay agents to explore
a-priori inferior options. This could be quite costly and we would like to avoid such expenses.
The mediator we propose does use payoffs. However it uses an arbitrarily small budget. In
other words, for any positive budget, no matter how small, we propose a mediator that is
incentive compatible (IC) and nearly optimal while being budget-balanced. As the budget
shrinks to zero the corresponding mediator requires a bigger population of agents to reach
approximate optimality.
The aforementioned literature can be viewed as extensions of the celebrated multi-armed
bandit problems ([2]) to deal with setting where exploration can only be done by self mo-
tivated myopic agents and a central planner must incentivize exploration. Although our
proposed mediator uses payments, the total budget spent can be arbitrarily small. Hence,
our work better fits the above literature where payments are avoided, rather than work on
incentevizing exploration through payments (e.g., [5]).
While the most related work to our study is the work on incentive-compatible exploration,
work on data aggregation from strategic players can be found also in other ML contexts as
described in e.g. [3], [4], [7] and [11].
2 Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N} be the set of agents. Each agent chooses one of two actions from
the set A = {R, S} (hereinafter referred to as the risky arm and safe arm correspondingly).
The reward from arm S is fixed and commonly known to be b while the reward from arm R
depends on the state of nature.1 Let Ω = {H,L} be the two possible states of nature, with
prior probability 0 < q = prob(H) < 1. Let ti ∈ {0, 1} the (random) reward from arm R
at stage i. The sequence of random variables, {ti}Ni=1 are IID conditional on the state. Let
pH = p(t
i = 1|H) be the probability for a reward of 1 at state H and let pL = p(ti = 1|L)
be its counterpart in state L.
We make two assumptions on the model parameters:
• The risky arm may be superior, in expectation, or inferior to the safe arm, depending
on the state of nature: pH > b > pL
1The model and results easily extend to the case where the reward over arm S is random but with a
commonly known expectation.
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• The risky arm is a-priori superior to the safe arm: qpH+(1−q)pL > b. Clearly, without
this assumption there is no way to convince an agent to try out the risky arm.
Agents arrive in a random order, σ : N → N (we abuse notation and use N to denote
the set of agents as well as the number of agents), where σ is a random permutation chosen
uniformly from all permutations. Let i denote an agent and j denote a stage. The equation
j = σ(i) suggest that agent i arrived at stage j. In what follows we mostly refer to agents
according to the (random) stage at which they arrive and not according to their name. We
denote by aj is the action of the agent arriving at stage j (and not the action of agent j).
The reward of the agent arriving at stage j, denoted rj, satisfies rj = tj whenever aj = R
and rj = b whenever aj = S.
Each agent observes:
• Which arm his predecessor pulled.
• The reward of his predecessor
• some private message sent to him by the mediator (the agent does not observe the
message of the mediator to his predecessor).
The input for the mediator, at stage j, is the sequence of rewards (which subsumes the
information about the chosen arms) received by the agents at all previous stages ({0, 1, b}j−1).
The output of the mediator is a message m in some abstract set M . Formally, a mediator is
a function mdr : ∪Nj=1{0, 1, b}
j−1 → M . Without loss of generality we can assume that the
message space, M , has the form M = A× Mˆ , which means that the recommendation for an
arm to pull in A is only a part of the message.
We extend the notion of a mediator in two directions:
• First we allow for a random message. To capture this we introduce an abstract input
space, Φ, and allow the message to depend on the random realization of φ ∈ Φ.
• In addition we extend the setting and allow the mediator to make payments (in the
same currency as the rewards). Therefore a mediator is random variable φ ∈ Φ and
a function mdr : ∪Nj=1{Φ × {0, 1, b}
j−1} → A ×M × R+, which includes, inter-alia,
a recommended action as well as a subsidy that is paid to the agents whenever this
recommendation is accepted. We denote by Im(mdr) the image of the mediator.
Formally, the utility of an agent i is ui(aσ(i), mσ(i), ω) and it is a function of the agent’s
action aσ(i), the message mσ(i) = (m
σ(i)
a , m
σ(i)
s , m
σ(i)
p ) and the state of nature, ω, as follows:
• If ai = S = mσ(i)a then ui = b+m
σ(i)
p
• If ai = S 6= mσ(i)a then ui = b
• If ai = R = mσ(i)a then ui = tσ(i) +m
σ(i)
p
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• If ai = R 6= mσ(i)a then ui = tσ(i)
Using large subsidies the mediator can induce agents to act in any way it pleases by
paying them enough to follow his recommendation. However, our challenge is to construct
a ‘lean’ mediator, one that uses a limited budget (arbitrarily small) and yet learns the state
of nature and steers most agents toward the optimal action.
A strategy for agent i is a function ρi : {0, 1, b} × M → A which determines which
arm to be pulled by agent i as a function of rσ(i)−1 and mσ(i). It is called Dominant if
ui(ρi(r, (ma, ms, mp)), (ma, ms, mp)) ≥ ui(a, (ma, ms, mp)) for any r ∈ 0, 1, b, any message
(ma, ms, mp) ∈ Im(mdr) and any a 6= ρi(r, (ma, ms, mp)).
Recall that a generic message is a triplet m = (ma, ms, mp). Agent i’s strategy is
mediator-respectful if aσ(i) = m
σ(i)
a . In words, if he pull the arm recommended by the medi-
ator no matter which arm he observed his predecessor pulled and what was the reward he
observed his predecessor got. If the mediator-respectful strategy is dominant for all agents,
i, then the mediator is said to be Incentive-Compatible. 2
More formally, mdr is Incentive Compatible (IC) if ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N , for any history
h = (φ; h1, . . . , hi−1) in Φ× {0, 1, b}
i−1 and for any action a ∈ A:
E((mdr(h))a|mdr(h), hi−1) + (mdr(h))p ≥ E(a|mdr(h), hi−1).
3
Our goal is to provide a mediator that induce sufficiently many agents to explore the
risky arm and use a negligible budget to do so.
A mediator is β-budget balanced if for any realization of φ and the sequence ti,
ΣNi=1m
i
p ≤ β. In other words, the sum of the subsidies promised never surpasses β. A
mediator is ǫ-optimal if it is incentive compatible and
ΣNi=1r
i
N
≥ (1 − ǫ)pH in state H and
ΣNi=1r
i
N
≥ (1− ǫ)b in state L.
3 The mediator
Assume one knows how to construct a mediator when agents do not observe each other. In
our setting each agent observes only his immediate predecessor and so agents in odd stages
do not observe each other. Thus, an intuitive extension of the preliminary mediator is to
implement the preliminary mediator only on odd stages (while ignoring the input from even
stages). Unfortunately, this will not work as information may be passed on indirectly. To
see why consider the agent at stage 3, denoted g3. If she observed g2 pulling the safe arm
she can conclude that g2 observed g1 pulling the safe arm or, otherwise, that g1 pulled the
2As a tie-break we assume that if the agent is indifferent between the two arms he will pull the arm that
is recommended by the mediator
3We pursue the terminology of [10] and use the notion of incentive comptability for mediators that
communicate an action, a ∈ A, instead of some abstract message, to each agent. Such a mediator is
‘incentive compatible’ if each agent finds it in her best interest to pursue the recommended action.
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risky arm but obtained a low reward (L). Hence, g3 (and similarly g5, g7 and so) may not
comply with a recommendation to check out the risky arm. In short, IC is not guaranteed.
This failed example sheds some light on the inherent difficulties to design a mediator:
• Agents are self motivated and will not agree to pull the recommended arm unless they
think it is in their best interest to do so.
• The mediator can only learn by observing a large enough sample of the risky arm. On
the other hand, roughly speaking, agents that observe their predecessor pull the risky
arm and get a low reward or observe the predecessor pull the safe arm will be inclined
to pull the safe arm. Hence, the mediator must. somehow, persuade many such agents
to pull the risky arm.
• By recommending agents to use the risky arm the mediator conveys additional infir-
mation implicitly. This, in turn, could influence their belief over which arm is optimal,
which may no longer be the recommended one.
• The mediator can only use a negligible budget.
We construct a formal parametric family of mediators, which we dub the Innkeeper’s
mediator, for reasons we describe in the footnote.4 We then argue that all these mediators
are IC and in addition are asymptotically optimal and budget balanced.
3.1 An informal description
We provide the formal description of the innkeeper mediator in terms of a pseudo-code.
However, before doing so we start with an informal description that provides some intuition
as to why it is IC and asymptotically optimal.
We break down the description of the innkeeper mediator to its three main phases. In
the first phase it only accumulates information and gains an informational advantage over
the agents without providing any recommendation. In the second phase the mediator use his
informational advantage in order to acquire all the knowledge needed to evaluate the state
of nature. In the third phase the mediator exploits this information.
• First phase - the ‘pre-intervention’ phase: During the first phase the mediator does not
interfere (formally, this is done by recommending to each agent what the agent would
have done in the absence of the mediator). The length of this phase, K, is set so that it
4An innkeeper recommends a local seafood restaurant to his customers. The quality of the restaurant is
well known and the innkeepr is happy to recommend it. One day a new restaurant opens up, the quality
of which is not known yet, and could possibly be better or worse than that of the familiar place. As the
innkeeper has shellfish allergy he cannot check out the new restaurant and must rely on patrons feedback.
Due to the inherent volatility in quality, feedback is required from a large sample. The inn has one room
and each guest, upon checking in, meets the previous guest and in particular learns which restaurant he
visited and whether he enjoyed it. The algorithm we design allows the innkeeper to learn the quality of the
restaurant and eventually steer his customers to the better restaurant.
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is sufficient to deduce the true reward distribution of the risky arm, if all agents during
this stage actually choose to pull it. The pre-intervention phase necessarily ends in one
of the following options:
1. All K agents pulled the risky arm and many of them enjoyed a high reward. In
this case the mediator can conclude that the state is very likely to be H .
2. All K agents pulled the risky arm and many of them were disappointed, in which
case the mediator can conclude that the state is very likely to be L.
3. Some of theK agents pull the safe arm and so the mediator might lack substantial
knowledge about the risky arm.
Consider an arbitrary agent that arrived after time K. Assuming this agent only knows
that case (2) or (3) have materialized (and nothing else) he would then prefer the safe
arm. This statement is obvious for case (2). To see why this also holds in case (3) note
that once an agent, among the first K, pulls the safe arm his successor will copy him.
The reason is that the successor must think that the predecessor pulled the safe arm
only because this was the optimal thing given the evidence available to him. With no
additional information to the successor he will follow the lead. On the other hand, if
he knows case (1) materialized then he would definitely pull the risky arm.
The mediator, in order to convince agents to pull the risky arm even if case (3) materi-
alizes, reveals this information partly in the following way. In case (1) he tosses a biased
coin (with parameter δ). Whenever the coin falls on Heads he announces that case (1)
happened and that he moves to the exploit phase (see below). If the coin falls on Tails
or if cases (2) or (3) materialized he announce that he moves to the switching phase.
The parameter δ can be chosen so that the aforementioned agent becomes indifferent
between pulling the two arms, and might as well accept the recommendation.
• Second phase - ‘switching’ phase: During the second phase we guarantee with high
enough probability exactly K switches in both directions - by switching we refer to a
scenario where an agent pulls one arm and his predecessor pulls the other arm. This
is done for two reasons:
1. It guarantees that K agents will pull the risky arm and, by doing so, the mediator
can learn the state of nature.
2. Maintain the indifference between the two arms for any agent that is recommended
a switch. This, in turn, will ensure that agents comply with the mediator’s rec-
ommendation.
The circumstances for which the mediator recommends a switch are as follows. Any-
time an agent pulls the safe arm, the next agent will be recommended the risky arm.
Also, anytime an agent pulls the risky arm and receives a low reward the mediator will
recommend to switch to the safe arm.
It turns out that with the correct choice of the coin’s parameter, δ, this recommendation
will become incentive compatible. Following K switches in each direction (2K switches
in total) the mediator is ready to move to the exploitation stage.
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Unfortunately, the number of periods for these 2K switches is an unbounded random
variable. However, by controlling the length of the switching phase to some large
integer we can guarantee 2K switches will occur with an arbitrary high probability.
The introduction of this bound distorts the aforementioned indifference between the
two arms. The longer the phase is the smaller the distortion. To resurrect indifference
we introduce transfers. The total transfers (the budget) shrink to zero as the distortions
become smaller and hence can be made arbitrarily low.
• Third phase -‘exploitation: In this phase the mediator collects no more information
and consistently recommends, what he deems, is the best arm. This phase is triggered
only if one of the following two events occurs:
1. Case (1) of the pre-intervention phase was materialized and the coin with proba-
bility δ was falling on Tail. However, in that case the mediator hadK samples of R
during the pre-intervention phase and it determined with high enough probability
that the world state of R is H .
2. The switching phase was finished with 2K switches. In this case the mediator had
at least K samples of R during the exploration phase and therefore can determine
the world state of R with high enough probability.
• Finally, to ensure agents follow the mediator even when some predecessor deviated,
then any such deviant would trigger a no-intervention policy once again.
3.2 Pseudo-code
We begin by describing the input space, the message space and the parameters of the medi-
ator and then provide a pseudo-code that details the mediator.
The random input φ is the result of a coin flip and hence it is in {0, 1}. Hereinafter we
replace φ with cf ∈ {0, 1} as a random variable determined by a coin flip with probability
δ for the outcome 1.
The message space is M = {R, S} × Mˆ ×R+, with generic message m = (ma, ms, mp):
• ma ∈ {R, S} is the action recommended by the mediator.
• ms ∈ Mˆ = {s1, s2, s3, s4} is some extra information offered to the agent. This infor-
mation encodes the phase at which the mediator is at. There are 4 phases:
– A pre-intervention phase, encoded s1. At this phase each agent is recommended
the arm he would have preferred based on his own knowledge.
– A switching phase, encoded s2. In this phase whenever an agent pulls the safe
arm his successor is recommended the risky arm and whenever an agent pulls the
risky arm and receives a low reward his successor is recommended the safe arm.
– An exploitation phase, encoded s3.
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– A deviation treatment phase, encoded s4, is triggered whenever some agent did
not follow the mediator’s recommended action. If a deviation occur before the
exploitation phase each agent will be recommended the arm he would have pre-
ferred based on his own knowledge. Deviations that occur during the exploitation
phase are ignored.
• mp is the subsidy.
Some auxiliary variables required for the pseudo-code are:
• Let xi = 1 whenever (ri−1 = 0 ∩mis = s2) and xi = 0 otherwise. Let X = Σ
N
i=1xi. In
words, X counts the number of stages during the second phase (the switching phase)
in which an agent observed his predecessor pull the risky arm and receive a low reward
(ri−1 = 0).
• Define R1 = [∩1≤i≤K{ai = R}] ∩ (
ΣKi=1t
i
K
≥ pH+pL
2
)}. In words, R1 is the event where
all agents in stages 1, . . . , K pulled the risky arm and their average reward exceeded
pH+pL
2
.
• Let R2 = [∩1≤i≤K{ai = R}] ∩ (
ΣKi=1t
i
K
< pH+pL
2
)}. In words, R2 is the event where
all agents in stages 1, . . . , K pulled the risky arm and their average reward fell below
pH+pL
2
.
• Let S = ∪1≤i≤K{ai = S} be the event where some agent is stages 1, . . . , K pulled the
safe arm (we abuse notation and use the same notation, S, for the safe arm and for an
event. The correct interpretation of S is always obvious from the context).
• Define s2 = ((R1 ∩ cf = 1) ∪ R2 ∪ S). In the event s2 the mediator will move to the
switching phase and otherwise it will begin exploitation. Note that the complement of
the event s2 is the event that the random coin, cf , equals 0 and in addition the initial
(pre-intervention) phase ended with all agents pulling the risky arm and the conclusion
is that this arm is most likely superior to the safe one.
• Define exploit f lag as a binary variable receiving the value ‘true’ whenever the medi-
ator in the exploitation phase.
• Define deviation flag as a binary variable receiving the value ‘true’ whenever a de-
viation of an agent is detected (namely, an agent does not follow the recommended
action).
• Let switching count count the number of agents, during the switching phase, who
pulled a different arm from their predecessor.
• R count counts the number of times the risky arm was pulled during the switching
phase.
• R sum keeps track of the total rewards received from the risky arm during the switching
phase.
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For any quadruple of parameters, N, β, δ,K, where δ is the coin parameter, N the population
size, K the sample size and β the budget constraint, we define the corresponding innkeeper
mediator, denoted INKP (N, β, δ,K), as follows: (the clarifying comments in blue are not
part of the pseudo-code)
The innkeeper mediator INKP (N, β, δ,K)
————————– Initiation ———————
• Set exploit f lag = false
• Set deviation flag = false
• Set R sum = 0, R count = 0
• Set switching count = 0
——————- On the equilibrium path ————
1. While deviation flag 6= true do:
• M˜1 = (R, s1, 0) ; If a1 6= R set deviation flag = true.
• For σ−1(i) : i = 2, . . . , N :
————————– Pre intervention phase ——————
– While i ≤ K do: If (E(ti|ri−1) > b) Set mia = R else set m
i
a = S.
M˜ i = (mia, s1, 0) ; If a
i 6= mia set deviation flag = true.
– If i = K + 1:
∗ Flip a coin with probability δ, and with probability δ set cf = 1 else set
cf = 0
∗ Check the following 3 conditions:
(a) ∀1 ≤ j ≤ K : aj = R
(b)
ΣKj=1r
j
K
≥ pH+pL
2
(c) cf = 0 (Recall cf is determined by a coin flip with probability δ see
Lemma 3 in appendix for δ)
∗ If all 3 conditions are satisfied set exploit f lag = true, exploit value = R
and for all i > K set M˜ i = (R, s3, 0) ; If a
i 6= mia set deviation flag =
true.
∗ If not all 3 conditions are satisfied set switching count = 0 and continue
to the switching phase
————————– Switching phase ——————————–
– while switching count < 2K do:
∗ if R count < K and ai−1 = R
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· R count = R count+ 1
· R sum = R sum+ ri
∗ If ri−1 = 1: set M˜ i = (R, s2, 0); If a
i 6= mia set deviation flag = true.
∗ If ri−1 = 0: set M˜ i = (S, s2,
β
2K
) and set switching count = switching count+
1; If ai 6= mia set deviation flag = true.
∗ If ri−1 = b set M˜ i = (R, s2,
β
2K
) and set switching count = switching count+
1 ; If ai 6= mia set deviation flag = true.
————————– Exploitation phase —————————-
– If switching count = 2K (note that switching count = 2K ensure at least
K agents took action a during the switching phase)
∗ If R sum
K
≥ pH+pL
2
set exploit f lag = true, exploit value = and for all i
set M˜ i = (R, s3, 0) ; If a
i 6= mia set deviation flag = true.
∗ If R sum
K
< pH+pL
2
set exploit f lag = true, exploit value = S and for all i
set M˜ i = (S, s3, 0); If a
i 6= mia set deviation flag = true.
———————— Off the equilibrium path ——————
2. while deviation flag = true do
• if exploit f lag = True: set M˜ i = (exploit value, s3, 0) for all i * Ignore deviations
that occur in the exploitation phase *
• if exploit f lag = false: for all i do:
If (E(ti|ai−1 ∩ ri−1 ∩mis = s4) > b) Set m
i
a = R else set m
i
a = S.
M˜ i = (mia, s4, 0) * Deviations that occur before the exploitation phase was trig-
gered - each agent is recommended the best response conditional on the agent’s
knowledge. *
4 Main Result and Proof sketch
We are finally ready to address our primary challenge. We show that for any pair of pa-
rameters, β and ǫ, there exists some number N and a corresponding incentive compatible,
β-budget balanced and ǫ-optimal mediator for any population with N agents or more.
Theorem 4.1. For any ǫ, β > 0 there exist N ′ ≥ K > 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1] such that the innkeeper
mediator INKP (N, β, δ,K) is incentive compatible, β-budget balanced and ǫ-optimal for all
N ≥ N ′ .
Sketch of proof: A formal proof is provided in an on-line appendix. We now explain the
main ingredients of this proof by expanding parts our informal description of the mediator
(Section 3.1).
In the pre-intervention phase the mediator is, de-facto, silent. In practice it submits a
recommendation for an arm which the agent would have pulled in the hypothetical case that
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the mediator does not exist. The length of this phase, K, is computed to ensure that a
sample of size K from the risky arm will reveal the state of nature with high probability (see
Lemmas 1 and 2 in the appendix). Recall this phase ends up in one of the following cases:
1. All K agents pulled the risky arm and were a majority of them was rewarded 1. In
this case the mediator can conclude that the state is very likely to be H .
2. All K agents pulled the risky arm and were a majority of them was rewarded 0. In
this case the mediator can conclude that the state is very likely to be L.
3. Some of the K agents pulled the safe arm.
While in cases (2) and (3) the mediator will continue to the switching phase, in case (1)
it will be decided by coin flip with probability δ if the mediator will continue to the switching
phase or jump strictly to the exploit phase. As a result, the mediator might know the better
choice (with high probability) but will choose not to exploit just yet. This happens in case
(1) and whenever the coin flip comes out Head or in case (2). This is done in order to allow
for exploration in case (3).
In Lemma 3 in the appendix we prove that there exists a δ ∈ [0, 1] that will make a
hypothetical ‘blind’ agent in the switching phase indifferent between the two arms. A ‘blind’
agent is an agent who does not observe his predecessor.
In reality agents are not blind and could observe one of three outcomes and recommen-
dations during the switching phase:
1. The predecessor pulled the risky arm and was rewarded 1. The mediator recommends
the risky arm again. In Lemma 4 in the appendix we prove that this recommendation
is IC.
2. The predecessor pulled the risky arm and was rewarded 0. The mediator recommends
to switch to the safe arm. In part (1) of Lemma 8 in the appendix we prove that this
recommendation is IC.
3. The predecessor pulled the safe arm. In that case the mediator will recommend him
to switch to the risky arm. In part (2) of Lemma 8 in the appendix we prove that this
recommendation is IC.
The switching phase will go on until 2K switches occur, in which case the required
information is accumulated and the mediator can turn to the exploitation stage. However, it
may be the case that the game ends before these 2K switches occur and so no exploitation
takes place. The possibility that the switching phase will not end introduces two problems:
• First, there is some probability that not enough information is accumulated.
• Second, it introduces a distortion in the incentives and the IC property no longer holds.
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However, by extending the switching phase to be long enough we can bound from below the
probability that such 2K switches occur arbitrarily close to 1. In Lemma 7 in the appendix
we introduce the desired length of the switching phase that guarantees that the 2K switches
will indeed occur with high probability. In Lemma 8 in the appendix we show that by
introducing transfers, the magnitude of which is arbitrarily low, we can resurrect the IC
property.
The proof of Theorem 1 is split to three propositions (see our on-line appendix): Propo-
sition 1 proves incentive compatibility, Proposition 2 accounts for ǫ-optimality and budget
balancedness is shown in Proposition 3.
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5 Appendix: Proofs
In this section we provide a sequence of lemmas and their proofs that are required for the
proof of our main result. The lemmas and their proofs are followed by the proof of our main
result, which split into 3 propositions.
5.1 Determining the sample size, K
The following first two lemmas are instrumental in computing the sample size given the
model parameters and the required level of efficiency:
Lemma 5.1. For any ǫ > 0 there exists K = K(ǫ) > 0 such that:
1. p(
ΣKi=1t
i
K
≥ pH+pL
2
|H) ≥ (1− ǫ)
2. p(
ΣKi=1t
i
K
< pH+pL
2
|L) ≥ (1− ǫ)
In fact, the required sample size is K = max{KH , KL}, where KH =
4pH(1−pH )
ǫ(pH−pL)2
and
KL =
4pL(1−pL)
ǫ(pH−pL)2
.
Proof :
Set KH =
4pH(1−pH )
ǫ(pH−pL)2
, KL =
4pL(1−pL)
ǫ(pH−pL)2
and K = max(KH , KL). Let X =
∑K
i=1 t
i be the
sum of the K rewards from pulling the risky arm.
Conditional on the state H the expectation of X is E(X) = KpH and its variance is
V ar(X) = KpH(1− pH).
p(
ΣKi=1t
i
K
<
pH + pL
2
|H) = Prob(X < K
pH + pL
2
) = Prob(E(X)−X > E(X)−K
pH + pL
2
) ≤
≤ Prob(E(X)−X > E(X)−K
pH + pL
2
)) + Prob(X − E(X) > E(X)−K
pH + pL
2
) =
= Prob(|E(X)−X| > E(X)−K
pH + pL
2
).
(1)
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Applying Chebyshev’s inequality:
Prob(|E(X)−X| > E(X)−K
pH + pL
2
) ≤
V ar(X)
(K pH+pL
2
−E(X))2
=
KpH(1− pH)
(K pH−pL
2
)2
=
4pH(1− pH)
K(pH − pL)2
(2)
However, since K ≥ 4pH (1−pH)
ǫ′(pH−pL)2
, from equations 1 and 2 we get
p(
ΣKi=1t
i
K
<
ph + pL
2
|H) ≤ ǫ′ (3)
The proof of the complementary case, when the state of nature is L, follows similar
arguments and is therefore omitted.
QED
Lemma 5.2. There exists Kb such that ∀Kb + 1 ≤ j ≤ N the following inequality holds:
E(tj |
Σ
Kb
i=1t
i
Kb
< pH+pL
2
) < b
This is essentially a corollary of Lemma 5.1.
Proof :
∀Kb + 1 ≤ j ≤ N : E(t
j |
ΣKbi=1t
i
Kb
<
pH + pL
2
) =
p(H|
ΣKbi=1t
i
Kb
<
pH + pL
2
)pH + p(L|
ΣKbi=1t
i
Kb
<
pH + pL
2
)pL ≤
p(H)
p(
Σ
Kb
i=1t
i
Kb
< pH+pL
2
)
p(
ΣKbi=1t
i
Kb
<
pH + pL
2
)|H) + pL ≤
1
p(
Σ
Kb
i=1t
i
Kb
< pH+pL
2
)
p(
ΣKbi=1t
i
Kb
<
pH + pL
2
)|H) + pL
(4)
Set ǫ′ = min(0.5, (1−q)(b−pL)
2
) and let K = K(ǫ′) be the corresponding sample size from
Lemma 5.1. We can now apply the inequalities in Lemma 5.1 to conclude that:
∀Kb + 1 ≤ j ≤ N : E(t
j |
ΣKbi=1t
i
Kb
<
pH + pL
2
) ≤
1
p(
Σ
Kb
i=1t
i
Kb
< pH+pL
2
)
ǫ′ + pL =
1
qp(
Σ
Kb
i=1t
i
Kb
< pH+pL
2
|H) + (1− q)p(
Σ
Kb
i=1t
i
Kb
< pH+pL
2
|L)
ǫ′ + pL ≤
1
(1− q)p(
Σ
Kb
i=1t
i
Kb
< pH+pL
2
|L)
ǫ′ + pL ≤
1
(1− q)(1− ǫ′)
ǫ′ + pL ≤ b
(5)
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Q.E.D
5.2 Exploit or switch?
On our path to proving the main theorem we make some interim observations. The first one
argues that there exists a parameter δ that induces indifference between the two arms once
the switching phase begins (assuming no additional information is available):
Lemma 5.3. For any ǫ, β > 0 there exist K ′ = K(ǫ) and δ ∈ [0, 1] such that for any
N > K > K ′ and any N ≥ i > K, the innkeeper mediator INKP (N, β, δ,K) satisfies
E(ti|M is = s2) = b.
The proof follow the mean value theorem. First we prove that in case δ = 1 the risky
arm will be preferable. Then we prove that in case δ = 0 the safe arm will be preferable.
Last we prove that the expected value of the safe arm is continues in δ ∈ [0, 1] and the proof
of the lemma will result from the mean value theorem.
Proof :
Recall that the event {mis = s2} is equivalent to the event {(R1 ∩ cf = 1) ∪ R2 ∪ S}.
Therefore:
∀K < i ≤ N : E(ti|M is = s2) = p(R1|M
i
s = s2)E(t
i|R1 ∩M
i
s = s2)+
p(R2|M
i
s = s2)E(t
i|R2 ∩M
i
s = s2) + p(S|M
i
s = s2)E(t
i|S ∩M is = s2) =
δp(R1)
δp(R1) + p(R2) + p(S)
E(ti|R1 ∩M
i
s = s2) +
p(R2)
δp(R1) + p(R2) + p(S)
)E(ti|R2 ∩M
i
s = s2)+
p(S)
δp(R1) + p(R2) + p(S)
E(ti|S ∩M is = s2)
(6)
from equation 6 we get
∀K < i ≤ N : E(ti|δ = 1 ∩mis = s2) = µR > b (7)
∀K < i ≤ N : E(ti|δ = 0 ∩mis = s2) =
p(R2)E(t
i|R2 ∩M is = s2)
p(R2) + p(S)
+
p(S)E(ti|S ∩M is = s2)
p(R2) + p(S)
(8)
Let ǫ′ = min(0.5, (1−q)(b−pL)
2
) and K = K(ǫ′) be the corresponding sample size from Lemma
5.1:
∀K < i ≤ N : E(ti|R2 ∩M
i
s = s2) = p(H|R2 ∩M
i
s = s2)pH + p(L|R2 ∩M
i
s = s2)pL ≤
ǫ′pH + (1− ǫ
′)pL ≤ pL + ǫ
′ (9)
Lemma 5.2 implies:
pL + ǫ
′ < b (10)
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Given mis = s2 implies the first K agents followes the recommendation of the mediator.
Hence we get:
∀K < i ≤ N : E(ti|S ∩M is = s2) = E(t
i|aK = S ∩M is = s2) < b (11)
Substituting equations 9, 10 and 11 into equation 8:
∀K < i ≤ N :
E(ti|δ = 0 ∩mis = s2) ≤
p(R2)(pL + ǫ
′)
p(R2) + p(S)
+
p(S)E(ti|S ∩M is = s2)
p(R2) + p(S)
<
p(R2)b
p(R2) + p(S)
+
p(S)b
p(R2) + p(S)
= b
(12)
For any other δ ∈ (0, 1) we get:
∀K < i ≤ N : E(ti|mis = s2) =
P (R1)δE(t
i|R1 ∩mis = s2) + p(R2)E(t
i|R2 ∩mis = s2) + p(S)E(t
i|S ∩mis = s2)
p(R1)δ + p(R2) + p(S)
(13)
Recall that we assume q 6= 0, 1 and so p(R2) + p(S) > 0 (to see this note that whenever
p(S) = 0 all K agents necessarily pulled the risky arm, which implies that p(R1) = q and
p(R2) = (1− q). Since q 6= 1 we get that p(R2) > 0).
Therefore, E(ti|mis = s2) must be a continuous as a function of the mediator parameter
δ.
From the intermediate value theorem and and inequalities 7 and 12 the desired conclusion
follows.
Q.E.D.
5.3 The switching phase
Suppose an agent knows that the mediator is in the switching phase and, in addition, observes
his predecessor pulling the risky arm and receiving a high reward. In that case the agent
will prefer the risky arm over the safe arm:
Lemma 5.4. For any ǫ, β > 0 there exist K ′ = K(ǫ) and δ ∈ [0, 1] such that for any
N > K > K ′ and any N ≥ i > K, the innkeeper mediator INKP (N, β, δ,K) satisfies
E(ti|ri−1 = 1 ∩mis = s2) ≥ b.
Proof :
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p(H|ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2) =
p(H ∩ ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)
p(ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)
=
p(mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)p(H|mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)p(ri−1 = 1|H ∩mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)
p(mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)p(ri−1 = 1|mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)
=
p(H|mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)
pH
p(H|mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)pH + p(L|mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)pL
>
p(H|mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)
pH
p(H|mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)pH + p(L|mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)pH
=
p(H|mis = s2 ∩ a
i−1 = R)
(14)
Let η = p(H|ri−1 = 1∩ai−1 = R∩mis = s2)−p(H|a
i−1 = R∩mis = s2) Hence from equation
14 we get:
p(H|ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)− p(H|a
i−1 = R ∩mis = s2) = η > 0 (15)
Given mis = s2 implies all previous agents followed the recommendation of the mediator
hence we get:
E(ti|ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2) ≥ b⇒
p(H|ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)E(t
i|H ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)+
p(L|ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)E(t
i|L ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2) ≥ b⇒
p(H|ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)pH + p(L|a
i−1 = R ∩mis = s2)pL ≥ b
(16)
E(ti|ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2) =
p(H|ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)E(t
i|H ∩ ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)+
p(L|ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)E(t
i|L ∩ ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2) =
p(H|ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)pH + p(L|r
i−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)pL.
(17)
Substituting equation 15 into equation 17:
E(ti|ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2) =
(p(H|ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2) + η)pH + [1− (p(H|a
i−1 = R ∩mis = s2) + η)]pL =
(p(H|ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2)pH) + (1− p(H|a
i−1 = R ∩mis = s2))pL+
ηpH − ηpL.
(18)
However, since (1 − p(H|ai−1 = R ∩ mis = s2) = p(L|a
i−1 = R ∩ mis = s2) then we can
substitute equation 16 in equation 18 to get
E(ti|ri−1 = 1 ∩ ai−1 = R ∩mis = s2) ≥
b+ ηpH − ηpL > b
(19)
Q.E.D.
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5.4 Success in the switching phase
.
The switching phase is deemed successful once 2K switches have been observed. Recall
that because we deal with finite populations the switching phase is not guaranteed to be
successful. Recall that X counts the number of times during the switching phase that an
agent observed his predecessor receive the reward 0 from the risky arm. Therefore the event
that the switching phase is successful can be denoted by {X = K}.
The following lemmas provide an analysis of the mediator and agent’s incentives, condi-
tional on the success of the switching phase.
In the following lemma we make use of the following notation: d = {(R1∩cf = 1)∪R2∪S}.
In words, d denotes the event that the mediator moved to the switching phase after the first
K agents. The lemma claims that all agents in the population face the same probability of
being recommended a switch, conditional on the event that indeed the switching phase was
successful. In particular, this probability is equal K
N
. This holds even when conditioned on
the realized state and the actual event that triggered the switching phase.
Lemma 5.5. For any of the three cases that trigger switching, Z ∈ {(R1 ∩ cf = 1), R2, S},
for any agent 1 ≤ i ≤ N and for any event whereby the mediator recommends a switch
during the switching phase, Yi ∈ {(rσ(i)−1 = 0 ∩m
σ(i)
s = s2), (r
σ(i)−1 = b ∩mσ(i)s = s2)}:
1. p(Yi|H ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) =
K
N
2. p(Yi|L ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) =
K
N
3. p(Yi|d ∩ {X = K}) =
K
N
4. p(Yi|Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) =
K
N
(Follows immediately from (1) and (2)).
Proof :
• case (1) - Yi = (r
σ(i)−1 = 0 ∩mσ(i)s = s2) :
1. p(Yi|H ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) = p(xσ(i) = 1|H ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K})
2. p(Yi|L ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) = p(xσ(i) = 1|L ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K})
3. p(Yi|d ∩ {X = K}) = p(xσ(i) = 1|d ∩ {X = K})
However, given X = ΣNi=1xi = K since σ is distributed uniformly we get: p(xσ(i) =
1|H ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) = p(xσ(i) = 1|L ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) = p(xσ(i) = 1|d ∩ {X =
K}) = K
N
.
Q.E.D case (1)
• case (2) - Yi = (rσ(i)−1 = b ∩m
σ(i)
s = s2) :
1. p(Yi|H ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) = p(xσ(i)−1 = 1|H ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K})
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2. p(Yi|L ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) = p(xσ(i)−1 = 1|L ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K})
3. p(Yi|d ∩ {X = K}) = p(xσ(i)−1 = 1|d ∩ {X = K})
5 However, given X = ΣNi=1xi = K since σ is distributed uniformly we get:p(xσ(i)−1 =
1|H∩Z∩d∩{X = K}) = p(xσ(i)−1 = 1|L∩Z∩d∩{X = K}) = p(xσ(i)−1 = 1|d∩{X =
K}) = K
N
.
Q.E.D case (2)
In the following lemma we argue that the expected reward from the risky arm and the
safe arm are equal conditional on the following information: (a) A switch from the safe to the
risky arm is recommended and a successful switching phase is guaranteed. (b) A switch from
the risky to the safe arm is recommended and a successful switching phase is guaranteed:
Lemma 5.6. For any agent after the pre-intervention phase, i > K, the following expected
rewards are equal:
E(tσ(i)|rσ(i)−1 = 0 ∩ {mσ(i)s = s2} ∩ {X = K}) =
E(tσ(i)|rσ(i)−1 = b ∩ {mσ(i)s = s2} ∩ {X = K}) =
E(tσ(i)|d ∩ {X = K}).
Proof :
∀Z ∈ {(R1 ∩ cf = 1), R2, S}, Yi ∈ {(r
σ(i)−1 = 0 ∩ mσ(i)s = s2), (r
σ(i)−1 = b ∩ mσ(i)s =
s2)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ N :
By bayes rule:
p(Z|Yi ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) =
p(Z|d ∩ {X = K})p(Yi|Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K})
p(Yi|d ∩ {X = K})
(20)
Applying Lemma 5.5 into equation 20 We get:
p(Z|Yi ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) = p(Z|d ∩ {X = K}) (21)
However since
⋃
Z∈{(R1∩cf=1),R2,S}
= d we get:
E(tσ(i)|Yi ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) =
ΣZ∈{(R1∩cf=1),R2,S}p(Z|Yi ∩ d ∩ {X = K})E(t
σ(i)|Yi ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K}))
(22)
Applying equation 21 into equation 22 we get:
E(tσ(i)|Yi ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) =
ΣZ∈{(R1∩cf=1),R2,S}p(Z|d ∩ {X = K})E(t
σ(i)|Yi ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K})
(23)
5Note that the above equations holds if {(R1 ∩ cf = 1) ∪ R2} else (if {S}) let mx = max(i : 1 ≤ i ≤
N |xi = 1), and mx must be switched with K. i.e. The first agent in the experiment will observe b and not
the last one
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From Lemma 5.5 we get:
E(tσ(i)|Yi ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K}) = p(H|Yi ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})pH + p(L|Yi ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})pL =
p(H ∩ Yi ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})pH
p(Yi ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})
+
p(L ∩ Yi ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})pL
p(Yi ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})
=
p(d ∩ Z ∩ {x = K})p(H|Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})p(Yi|H ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})pH
p(d ∩ Z ∩ {x = K})p(Yi|Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})
+
p(d ∩ Z ∩ {x = K})p(L|Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})p(Yi|L ∩ Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})pL
p(d ∩ Z ∩ {x = K})p(Yi|Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})
=
p(H|Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})pH + p(L|Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})pL = E(t
σ(i)|Z ∩ d ∩ {x = K})
(24)
Applying equation 24 into equation 23 we get:
E(tσ(i)|Yi ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) =
ΣZ∈{(R1∩cf=1),R2,S}p(Z|d ∩ {X = K})E(t
σ(i)|Z ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) =
E(tσ(i)|d ∩ {X = K})
(25)
However, since (Yi ∩ (cf = 0)) = ∅ we get:
E(tσ(i)|Yi ∩ d ∩ {X = K}) = E(t
σ(i)|Yi ∩ {X = K}) (26)
From equations 25 and 26 we get:
E(tσ(i)|rσ(i)−1 = 0 ∩ {mσ(i)s = s2} ∩ {X = K})
= E(tσ(i)|rσ(i)−1 = b ∩ {mσ(i)s = s2} ∩ {X = K})
= E(ti|d ∩ {X = K})
(27)
Q.E.D
5.5 The actual length of the switching phase
The length of the switching phase is a random variable and depends on the number of times
the risky arm is pulled and a low reward is realized. Given n attempts of pulling the risky
arm, let Y be the number of occurrences of low rewards. Note that Y is a binomial random
variable with distribution B(n, 1−pω), at state ω. By choosing n large enough we can provide
an upper bound on the probability of the event that sufficiently many switches occur:
Lemma 5.7. Assume Y ∼ B(n, 1− pH) and X ∼ B(n, 1− pL). Then ∀K > 0, β > 0 there
exists n′ such that ∀n > n′ :
1. p(Y < K) ≤ β
4K
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2. p(X < K) ≤ β
4K
Proof :
Prob(Y < K) = Prob(E(Y )− Y > E(Y )−K) ≤
≤ Prob(E(Y )− Y > E(Y )−K)) + Prob(Y − E(Y ) > E(Y )−K) =
= Prob(|E(Y )−X| > E(Y )−K).
(28)
Applying Chebyshev inequality:
Prob(|E(Y )− Y | > E(Y )−K) ≤
V ar(Y )
(K −E(Y ))2
=
npH(1− pH)
(K − n(1− pH))2
(29)
It suffices to prove the first part as the second part follows the same arguments, and since
PH > pL same n
′ will hold.
npH(1− pH)
(K − n(1− pH))2
≤
β
4K
⇔
npH(1− pH) ≤ (K − n(1− pH))
2 β
4K
⇔
npH(1− pH)
β
4K
≤ K2 − 2k(1− pH)n+ (1− pH)
2n2 ⇔
(1− pH)
2n2 − (1− pH)(2K +
pH
β
4K
)n+K2 ≥ 0⇔
n ≥
(1− pH)(2K +
pH
β
4K
) +
√
[(1− pH)(2K +
pH
β
4K
)]2 − 4(1− pH)2K2
2(1− pH)2
(30)
Let n′ =
(1−pH)(2K+
pH
β
4K
)+
√
[(1−pH )(2K+
pH
β
4K
)]2−4(1−pH )2K2
2(1−pH )2
the proof followed from equations 30
and 29.
QED
5.6 The introduction of transfers
In Lemma 5.6 we proved that in the hypothetical case that 2K switches is guaranteed
the agents will be fully indifference between the two arms case they get the switch signal.
In lemma 5.7 we prove we can determine the time needed to ensure 2K switches with
high enough probability. In the following lemma we will prove that the impossibility to
guarantee 2K switches can be overcome by using transfers. The magnitude of these transfers
is determined in lemma 5.7 and can be arbitrarily low at the expense of the proportion of
agents to enjoy the exploitation phase.
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Lemma 5.8. Given the model parameters pH , pL, q and b, the needed asymptotic optimality
factor ǫ, then ∀β > 0 and K > 0 ∃N ′|∀N ≥ N ′ and δ ∈ [0, 1] such that the innkeeper
mediator INKP (N, β, δ,K) satisfies:
1. ∀1 < i ≤ N : E(tσ(i)|rσ(i)−1 = 0 ∩ {mσ(i)s = s2}) ≤ b+
β
2K
2. ∀1 < i ≤ N : E(tσ(i)|rσ(i)−1 = b ∩ {mσ(i)s = s2}) +
β
2K
≥ b
Proof :
Let us mark ∀1 < i ≤ N : Y 1i = {(r
σ(i)−1 = 0 ∩mσ(i)s = s2} and Y 2i = {r
σ(i)−1 = b ∩mσ(i)s =
s2)} . Recall from Lemma 5.7 that n′ =
(1−pH )(2K+
pH
β
4K
)+
√
[(1−pH)(2K+
pH
β
4K
)]2−4(1−pH )2K2
2(1−pH )2
and let
N ′ = n′ +K.
Hence from Lemma 5.7 we get:
p(x = K|Y 1i ∩ d) ≥ 1−
β
4K
;
p(x = K|Y 2i ∩ d) ≥ 1−
β
4K
(31)
Hence we get:
E(tσ(i)|Y 1i ∩ d) =
p(x = K|Y 1i ∩ d)E(t
σ(i)|Y 1i ∩ d ∩ x = K) + p(x < K|Y
1
i ∩ d)E(t
σ(i)|Y 1i ∩ d ∩ x < K) ≤
1E(tσ(i)|Y 1i ∩ d ∩ x = K) +
β
4K
E(tσ(i)|Y 1i ∩ d ∩ x < K)) ≤
E(tσ(i)|Y 1i ∩ d ∩ x = K) +
β
4K
(32)
From Lemma 5.6 and equation 32 we get:
E(tσ(i)|Y 1i ∩ d) ≤ E(t
σ(i)|d ∩ x = K) +
β
4K
=
p(x = K|d)E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x = K) + (1− p(x = K|d))E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x = K)+
p(x < K|d)E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x < K)− p(x < K|d)E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x < K) +
β
4K
≤
[p(x = K|d)E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x = K) + p(x < K|d)E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x < K)]+
(1− p(x = K|d))E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x = K) +
β
4K
≤
E(tσ(i)|d) +
β
4K
E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x = K) +
β
4K
≤ b+ 2
β
4K
= b+
β
2K
(33)
Since (Y 1i ∩ (cf = 0)) = ∅ we get:
E(tσ(i)|Y 1i ) = E(t
σ(i)|Y 1i ∩ d) (34)
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From equations 33 and 34 we get:
E(tσ(i)|Y 1i ) ≤ b+
β
2K
(35)
Q.E.D(1)
On the other hand from equation 31 we also get:
E(tσ(i)|Y 2i ∩ d) =
p(x = K|Y 2i ∩ d)E(t
σ(i)|Y 2i ∩ d ∩ x = K) + p(x < K|Y
2
i ∩ d)E(t
σ(i)|Y 2i ∩ d ∩ x < K) ≥
(1−
β
4K
)E(tσ(i)|Y 2i ∩ d ∩ x = K) ≥ E(t
σ(i)|Y 2i ∩ d ∩ x = K)−
β
4K
(36)
From Lemma 5.6 and equation 36 we get:
E(tσ(i)|Y 2i ∩ d) ≥ E(t
σ(i)|d ∩ x = K)−
β
4K
=
p(x = K|d)E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x = K) + (1− p(x = K|d))E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x = K)+
p(x < K|d)E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x < K)− p(x < K|d)E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x < K)−
β
4K
≥
[p(x = K|d)E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x = K) + p(x < K|d)E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x < K)]−
− p(x < K|d)E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x < K)−
β
4K
≥
E(tσ(i)|d)−
β
4K
E(tσ(i)|d ∩ x < K)−
β
4K
≥ b− 2
β
4K
= b−
β
2K
(37)
Since (Y 2i ∩ (cf = 0)) = ∅ we get:
E(tσ(i)|Y 2i ) = E(t
σ(i)|Y 2i ∩ d) (38)
From equations 37 and 38 we get:
E(tσ(i)|Y 2i ) +
β
2K
≥ b (39)
Q.E.D(2)
5.7 Proof of main theorem
Recall the main Theorem:
Theorem 4.1: For any ǫ, β > 0 there exist N ′ ≥ K > 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1] such that the
innkeeper mediator INKP (N, β, δ,K) is incentive compatible, β-budget balanced and ǫ-
optimal for all N ≥ N ′ .
Proof of Theorem 4.1 :
24
Given ǫ, β > 0, we will first offer the appropriate K and N ′ and we will use Lemma
5.3 for the existence of an appropriate δ. Afterwards We will break down the proof into
three propositions which correspond to the three claims stated in the theorem: incentive
compatibility, ǫ-optimality and β-budget balanced.
Finding an appropriate parameter K:
Given ǫ, β > 0 we will demand that K will be big enough both to satisfy all the relevant
Lemmas needed in our proof and to satisfy the demands for ǫ-optimal.
• To satisfy conditions for Lemma 5.1 with ǫ
4
(needed for ǫ-optimal): SetK1H =
4pH (1−pH)
ǫ
4
(pH−pL)2
,
K1L =
4pL(1−pL)
ǫ
4
(pH−pL)2
and K1 = max(K1H , K1L).
• To satisfy conditions for Lemma 5.2: Set K2H =
4pH (1−pH)
min(0.5,
(1−q)(b−pL)
2
)(pH−pL)2
,
K2L =
4pL(1−pL)
min(0.5,
(1−q)(b−pL)
2
)(pH−pL)2
and K2 = max(K2H , K2L).
• K that satisfies the conditions of Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 satisfies the conditions of lemmas
5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8.
Hence the appropriate K to satisfy all our needed conditions will be K = max(K1, K2)
Finding an appropriate parameter N ′:
After finding an appropriate parameter K we will now turn to find an appropriate pa-
rameter N ′ big enough both to satisfy all the relevant Lemmas needed in our proof and to
satisfy the demands for ǫ-optimal (note that N ′ depends on K and therefore we had to find
an appropriate K first).
Let nˆ =
(1−pH )(2K+
pH
min(
β
4K
, ǫ4 )
)+
√
[(1−pH)(2K+
pH
min(
β
4K
, ǫ4 )
)]2−4(1−pH )2K2
2(1−pH )2
• To satisfy conditions for Lemmas 5.7 and 5.8 we will demand:
N ′1 = K + nˆ
• To satisfy ǫ-optimal we will demand N ′2 =
2
ǫ
[K + nˆ] > N ′1
Hence the appropriate N ′ to satisfy all our needed conditions will be N ′ = 2
ǫ
[K + nˆ]
existence of appropriate parameter δ:
Given ǫ, β > 0, and finding appropriate K and N ′. From Lemma 5.3 there exists δ ∈ [0, 1]
such that for any N > N ′ and any N ≥ i > K, the innkeeper mediator INKP (N, β, δ,K)
satisfies E(ti|M is = s2) = b.
Proof break down to three propositions :
After we offered the appropriate K and N ′ and used Lemma 5.3 for the existence of an ap-
propriate δ, we break down the proof into three propositions which correspond to the three
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claims stated in the theorem: incentive compatibility, ǫ-optimality and β-budget balanced.
Incentive compatibility:
Proposition 5.9. For every N > N ′, the innkeeper mediator INKP (N, β, δ,K) is incentive
compatible.
Proof :
The first agent will get the message (R, s1, 0) and will optimally comply since qpH +
(1 − q)pL > b. We now consider 4 cases: agents getting mis = s1(pre intervention) in the
message, agents getting mis = s2(switching) in the message, agents getting m
i
s = s3(exploit)
in the message and agents getting mis = s4(deviation) in the message
1. Consider an agent getting mis = s1 in the message. Since m
i
s 6= s4 all other agents
follow the recommendation of the mediator. In this case the agent can deduce he
is among the first K arriving agents. However, since for those agents the mediator
calculate and recommend the arm which is the best response according to the agent’s
knowledge he will comply and pull the recommended arm.
2. Consider an agent getting mis = s2 in the message. Since m
i
s 6= s4 all other agents
follow the recommendation of the mediator. There are 3 possible cases:
(a) The agent observe his predecessor pulled the risky arm and rewarded 1. In this
case according to the mediator he will get the message M˜σ(i) = (R, s2, 0). Ac-
cording to Lemma 5.4 E(tσ(i)|rσ(i)−1 = 1 ∩ {mσ(i)s = s2}) ≥ b and therefore his
best response will be to pull the risky arm and therefore he will comply.
(b) The agent observe his predecessor pulled the risky arm and rewarded 0. In this
case according to the mediator he will get the message M˜σ(i) = (S, s2,
β
2K
). Ac-
cording to Lemma 5.8 E(tσ(i)|rσ(i)−1 = 0 ∩ {mσ(i)s = s2}) ≤ b +
β
2K
and therefore
his best response will be to pull the safe arm and get extra payment of β
2K
for
doing so. Therefore he will comply.
(c) The agent observe his predecessor pulled the safe arm and rewarded b. In this case
according to the mediator he will get the message M˜σ(i) = (R, s2,
β
2K
). According
to Lemma 5.8 E(tσ(i)|rσ(i)−1 = b ∩ {mσ(i)s = s2}) +
β
2K
≥ b and therefore his best
response will be to pull the risky arm and get extra payment of β
2K
for doing so.
Therefore he will comply.
3. Consider an agent gettingmis = s3 in the message. Sincem
i
s 6= s4 all other agents follow
the recommendation of the mediator. Note that s3 is send only in cases the mediator
observe enough samples of the risky arm and decide with high enough probability if
the state of the risky arm is H or L. If it determine the state is H it recommend to
pull the risky arm and in such case ∀j : K + 1 < j < N : E(tj |
ΣKi=1t
i
K
≥ pH+pL
2
) ≥
qpH+(1−q)pL ≥ b and therefore the agent will comply. If the mediator determine the
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state is L it recommend to pull the safe arm and according to Lemma 5.2 ∀j|K + 1 ≤
j ≤ N : E(tj|
ΣKi=1t
i
K
< pH+pL
2
) < b and therefore the agent will comply.
4. Consider an agent getting mis = s4 in the message. In that case let’s consider 2 sub-
cases:
• exploit f lag = true: in that case the mediator already determined before the
deviation occur with high enough probability if the state of the risky arm is H
or L. And therefore the same argument as in the case of s3 holds and the best
response of the agent is to comply and pull the recommended arm.
• exploit f lag = false: since in this case the mediator calculate and recommend
the arm which is the best response according to the agent knowledge the best
response is to comply and pull the recommended arm.
Since in both cases the best response is to comply and pull the recommended arm we
get that whenever an agent getting s4 in the message the best response is to pull the
recommended arm.
Q.E.D
ǫ-optimal:
Proposition 5.10. For every N > N ′, the innkeeper mediator INKP (N, β, δ,K) is ǫ-
optimal.
Proof :
Since K satisfies the conditions of Lemma 5.1 we get:
∀j : K + 1 ≤ j ≤ N : p({M ja = R}|H ∩ {M
j
s = s3}) ≥ 1−
ǫ
4
(40)
And
∀j : K + 1 ≤ j ≤ N : p({M ja = S}|L ∩ {M
j
s = s3}) ≥ 1−
ǫ
4
(41)
Recall xi = 1 if (r
i−1 = 0 ∩ {mis = s2}), xi = 0 elsewhere. X = Σ
n
i=1xi (the number of
switching from the risky arm to the safe arm during the switching phase).
From Lemma 5.7 ∃n (we will mark it as nˆ) such that: 6
p(X < K|H) ≤ min(
β
4K
,
ǫ
4
) (42)
p(X < K|L) ≤ min(
β
4K
,
ǫ
4
) (43)
6Let nˆ =
(1−pH)(2K+
pH
min(
β
4K
, ǫ
4
)
)+
√
[(1−pH)(2K+
pH
min(
β
4K
, ǫ
4
)
)]2−4(1−pH )2K2
2(1−pH )2
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By taking N ′ = 2
ǫ
[K + nˆ] we get that:
∀0 ≤ i ≤ N ′ : p({M is = s3}|{X = K}) ≥
N ′ − (K + nˆ)
N ′
=
(2
ǫ
− 1)(K + nˆ)
2
ǫ
(K + nˆ)
= (1−
ǫ
2
) (44)
From equations 40, 42, 44 we get:
∀0 ≤ i ≤ N ′ : p({Mσ(i)a = R}|H) =
p({X = K}|H)p({Mσ(i)a = R}|{X = K} ∩H)+
p({X < K}|H)p({Mσ(i)a = R}|{X < K} ∩H) ≥
p({X = K}|H)p({Mσ(i)a = R}|{X = K} ∩H) =
p({X = K}|H)p({Mσ(i)s = s3}|{X = K} ∩H)p({M
σ(i)
a = R}|H ∩ {M
σ(i)
s = s3} ∩ {X = K)}+
p({X = K}|H)p({Mσ(i)s 6= s3}|{X = K} ∩H)p({M
σ(i)
a = R}|H ∩ {M
σ(i)
s 6= s3} ∩ {X = K)} ≥
p({X = K}|H)p({Mσ(i)s = s3}|{X = K} ∩H)p({M
σ(i)
a = R}|H ∩ {M
σ(i)
s = s3} ∩ {X = K)} ≥
(1−
ǫ
4
)(1−
ǫ
2
)(1−
ǫ
4
) ≥
(1−
ǫ
2
)(1−
ǫ
2
) ≥
1− ǫ
(45)
From equations 41, 43, 44 we get:
∀0 ≤ i ≤ N ′ : p({Mσ(i)a = S}|L) ≥
p({X = K}|L)p({Mσ(i)s = s3}|{X = K} ∩ L)p({M
σ(i)
a = S}|L ∩ {M
σ(i)
s = s3} ∩ {X = K} ≥
(1−
ǫ
4
)(1−
ǫ
2
)(1−
ǫ
4
) ≥
(1−
ǫ
2
)(1−
ǫ
2
) ≥
1− ǫ
(46)
From equations 45 , 46 we get that in equilibrium: If H then E(
ΣNi=1r
i
N
) ≥ (1 − ǫ)pH else
E(
ΣNi=1r
i
N
) ≥ (1− ǫ)b
Q.E.D.
β-budget balanced:
Proposition 5.11. For every N > N ′, the innkeeper mediator INKP (N, β, δ,K) is β-
budget balanced.
Proof :
Recall xi = 1 if (r
i−1 = 0∩ {mis = s2}), xi = 0 elsewhere. Let yi = 1 if (r
i−1 = b∩ {mis =
s2}), yi = 0 elsewhere. Note ∀i : xiyi = 0. according to the mediator a payment of
β
2K
is
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offered only in case of xi = 1 or yi = 1. Hence we get:
ΣNi=1m
i
p =
β
2K
ΣNi=1xi +
β
2K
ΣNi=1yi ≤
β
2K
K +
β
2K
K = β (47)
Q.E.D.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 follows from Propositions 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11.
Q.E.D
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